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 W
HAT IS A TEXT? THAT QUESTION IS FRAUGHT WITH ONTOLOG- 
ical uncertainty. Are texts nothing more than their physical 
manifestations? Or can we meaningfully speak of texts as 
abstractions that transcend the context of their embodiment? Lit-
erary scholars and copyright lawyers have generally held diferent 
views on these questions. In recent decades, interest in material cul-
ture has spurred many literary scholars to identify texts with spe-
ciic objects: quires of printed paper bound with fabric, board, and 
glue; bundles of handwritten pages tied with twine; or corporeal, 
albeit ephemeral, patterns of electrical signals rendered on a screen. 
But that approach jars with the doctrines of copyright law, which 
imagines texts as intangible, immaterial, and wholly indiferent to 
the arbitrary physical bodies—books, manuscripts, or screens—that 
serve as their vessels. For that reason many literary scholars since 
the 1980s have looked askance at copyright law, even as they have 
emphasized its historical signiicance; a view of texts as things that 
transcend their contingent material origins is bound to be met with 
skepticism by a critical mainstream suspicious of the metaphysics of 
presence and grounded in the methods of historical materialism. At 
its most skeptical, this mainstream regarded copyright as an ideo-
logical imposture, or even as a quasi- religious institution.1
Ontological concerns like these have structured thought about 
copyright since the beginnings of the Romantic period. In the late 
eighteenth century, an anonymous German bookseller wrote that 
“the book is not an ideal object. . . . [I] t is a fabrication made of paper. 
. . . [I] t does not contain thoughts; these must arise in the mind of the 
comprehending reader. It is a commodity produced for hard cash,” 
while Johann Fichte argued to the contrary that a book embodies 
an irreducible fragment of its author’s intellect: “each individual has 
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his own thought processes, his own way of 
forming concepts and connecting them. . . . 
[N] o one can appropriate his thoughts with-
out thereby altering their form. This latter 
thus remains forever his exclusive property” 
(qtd. in Woodmansee 443–45). These com-
peting accounts agree that the legitimacy of 
copyright depends on the relations we posit 
between idealized forms and physical objects. 
This way of thinking postdates the rise of 
copyright law in En gland. Fichte’s Romantic, 
post- Kantian idealism and the bookseller’s 
proto- Marxist materialism were both ges-
tating at least eighty years after the British 
Parliament passed the irst copyright law, the 
Statute of Anne, in 1710.
his essay outlines an intellectual history 
of the beginnings of copyright law unencum-
bered by these characteristically nineteenth- 
century questions about the ontological status 
of the material and the ideal, which continue 
to shape literary scholarship’s engagement 
with copyright. Rather than ask what texts 
are, I ask what texts do. Scholars have seen 
copyright either as the beginning of a pro-
gressive new regime of intellectual property 
or as an early symptom of capitalism’s drive 
to commoditize ever- more- abstract entities. 
Neither of these points of view adequately 
characterizes the attitudes of the think-
ers and jurists of the eighteenth century. To 
gain a clearer picture of the complex and di-
vergent interpretations of copyright law in 
eighteenth- century Britain and their impact 
on textual production, reproduction, distribu-
tion, and reception, critics and scholars need 
to shit their attention from ontological ques-
tions to epistemological ones. What matters 
is not whether there can or ought to be such a 
thing as incorporeal property. What matters 
are the ways eighteenth- century individuals 
conceptualized their own practices as authors 
and readers. In some cases jurists and pam-
phleteers quibbled over ontological questions, 
but their quibbles masked deeper divisions, 
over knowledge—what it is, where it comes 
from, how it is transferred, and whether it 
can ever be truly private. These questions 
concerned not what texts were but what they 
did—the roles they played in the creation, de-
velopment, and dissemination of knowledge.
By bracketing ontological concerns in 
favor of the epistemological question What 
do texts do?, this essay explores an alternative 
intellectual genealogy of copyright law that 
troubles familiar associations between liter-
ary property, textual stability, interpretive 
closure, and transcendental authorial pres-
ence. The material turn in literary studies 
has seemed to repudiate those closely linked 
ideas. The material text, subject to contin-
gency and decay, is an irreducibly noisy chan-
nel of communication. The literary work it 
embodies is not the immutable creation of a 
sovereign poetic will; it is the luid product of 
multiple collaborators, iltered through a di-
vided poetic consciousness and misprinted on 
fragile slips of paper. Copyright relies on the 
text’s transcendence, and it is unsettled by the 
text’s corporeality. But in eighteenth- century 
Britain this neat alignment of categories did 
not hold. Many of copyright’s boldest advo-
cates emphasized textual contingency and 
instability, while its most stubborn detrac-
tors insisted on the ixity and ideality of the 
literary work. From the perspective of many 
eighteenth- century thinkers, literary prop-
erty is airmed by an authorial absence, an 
indication that the text has failed to serve as a 
transparent channel of communication, fully 
connecting readers and authors. A history of 
copyright that can make sense of this surpris-
ing coniguration of concepts could produce 
new insights into questions that are driving 
current trends in literary thought—questions 
about the relation between the phenomenal 
and the given and their role in the production 
and consumption of communicative matter.
his essay tells such a history, grounded 
in seventeenth- and eighteenth- century epis-
temological debates that pitted innatism 
against empiricism. Innatists held the view 
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that all individuals share the same intrinsic 
ideas from birth, while empiricists believed 
that ideas are produced only by experience 
and are therefore unique to individuals. he 
contest between these positions progressed 
from the mid–seventeenth to the end of the 
eighteenth century, beginning as a disagree-
ment among philosophers, the most inf lu-
ential of whom were a group of innatists 
known as the Cambridge Platonists and the 
empiricist John Locke. It then slowly iltered 
into the wider public sphere through multiple 
channels, ultimately structuring legal dis-
course in ways that directly inluenced mid- 
eighteenth- century copyright debates. hese 
latter debates ostensibly concerned the dura-
tion of copyright protection; copyright per-
petualists argued that copyright protection 
should never expire, while their opponents 
argued that copyright protection should be 
limited in term. But as they progressed, these 
debates began to consider questions about 
the nature of communication: Can ideas be 
held privately? Can they be transferred? If so, 
what enables their transmission? And, most 
centrally, what do texts do when they com-
municate knowledge?
As scholars have long recognized, Locke’s 
labor theory of property played a prominent 
role in these debates. Property, Locke argued, 
arises when an individual labors to create 
something new, and copyright perpetualists 
sought to extend that reasoning from bodily 
to mental labor.2 But Locke’s epistemological 
theories were far more signiicant to the copy-
right debate than the labor theory of property, 
which could not apply to textual works unless 
they were produced by private labor, a claim 
that innatists questioned. By rejecting the no-
tion that some ideas are innate and universal, 
constituting a shared intellectual commons, 
Locke laid the groundwork for a new concep-
tion of ideas as private—and of the texts that 
expressed them as private property. Not yet 
stymied by the idea- expression dichotomy en-
coded in today’s copyright law, copyright per-
petualists saw in this Lockean view of ideas 
an opportunity to extend copyright protec-
tion indeinitely. However, by denying the ex-
istence of innate ideas, Locke destabilized the 
theories of communication that were implicit 
in innatist thought, for if we have no body of 
common ideas to draw on, how can we begin 
to understand each other?
To demonstrate how defenders of perpet-
ual copyright and their opponents answered 
this question, I irst take up the philosophical 
discourse around ideas in seventeenth- and 
eighteenth- century Britain, examining the 
views of the Cambridge Platonists and Locke’s 
refutation of their assertions. In doing so, I 
show how Locke challenged the dogma that 
ideas are universally communicable. I then 
analyze Edward Young’s Conjectures on Orig-
inal Composition to reveal how Young attacks 
the same dogma from an innatist perspective. 
In the following section I describe the roles 
that Locke’s and Young’s positions played in 
Tonson v. Collins (1762), the case in which 
“the basic shape of the literary- property de-
bate was realized” (Rose, Authors 78); this 
case illustrates the multiple ways that jurists 
conjoined innatist and empiricist views of lit-
erary ideas. I argue that these bodies of evi-
dence show that the rise of modern copyright 
law was accompanied by a radical transfor-
mation in ideas about communication, which 
linked literary and economic value to the 
least communicative aspects of a text. In-
natists had imagined language as a natural, 
transparent extension of human thought, but 
eighteenth- century copyright law instead en-
shrined a way of thinking about what texts do 
that foregrounds and privileges the moments 
when meaning escapes us, when communica-
tion breaks down—moments of interruption 
in the smooth functioning of language.
Epistemology and the Intellectual Commons
In 1739 David Hume wrote that “the principle 
of innate ideas . . . is now almost  universally 
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rejected in the learned world” (106). As sup-
port for this sweeping claim, he offers one 
terse footnote: “See Mr. Locke; chapter of 
power.” hat Hume felt he need only invoke 
Locke’s name with a vague citation to make 
his point suggests a widespread knowledge 
of Locke’s argument among Hume’s readers. 
However, this knowledge did not result in the 
near universal assent that Hume described. 
he doctrine of innate ideas remained inlu-
ential ater Locke rejected it, especially among 
religious thinkers, who oten used variations 
on the doctrine to defend the universality of 
moral judgments.3 Far from being easily dis-
missed, innatism persistently posed challeng-
ing questions to the philosophers who hoped 
to reject it, and it shaped many developments 
in eighteenth- century epistemology.
Innatism had experienced a surge of 
popularity in the mid–seventeenth century, 
especially among religious thinkers, when a 
loose group of Cambridge- educated divines 
took up various forms of the doctrine as part 
of their turn away from Aristotelian scholas-
ticism. hough they drew from a wide range 
of philosophical strains, including new de-
velopments in the emerging sciences, they all 
partook of some variety of neoplatonism, and 
among historians of philosophy they are col-
lectively known as the Cambridge Platonists 
(Hutton, “Lord Herbert” 20–34). Among the 
Cambridge Platonists were Benjamin Which-
cote (1609–83), Henry More (1617–87), Ralph 
Cudworth (1617–88), John Smith (1618–52), 
and Nathanael Culverwel (1619–51), each of 
whom formulated some version of innatism 
in support of a rational theology. Culverwel 
described a “sacred Manuscript . . . writ by 
the inger of God himself in the heart of man” 
(34); John Smith spoke of “some radical prin-
ciples of knowledge . . . sunk into the souls 
of men” (16), principles that can only be fully 
perceived and understood by those who “shut 
the eyes of sense, and open that brighter eye 
of our understandings, that other eye of the 
soul” (19). For Smith and Culverwel, as for 
many other Cambridge Platonists, this innate 
rational faculty facilitated the individual pur-
suit of divine truth, which one might carry 
out independent of any worldly authority.
Though their primary concerns were 
theological, several of the Cambridge Pla-
tonists also constructed sophisticated epis-
temological theories. Henry More, in An 
Antidote against Atheism (1653), laid out a 
theory of innate knowledge that drew liber-
ally from Plato. “There is an active and ac-
tuall Knowledge in a man,” More wrote, “of 
which . . . outward objects are rather the re-
minders then the irst begetters or implant-
ers” (19–20). To elucidate this claim, he ofers 
the following evocative metaphor:
Suppose a skillful Musician fallen asleep in 
the ield upon the grasse, during which time 
he shall not so much as dream any thing con-
cerning his musicall faculty, so that in one 
sense there is no actuall skill or Notion nor 
representation of any thing musical in him, 
but his friend sitting by him that cannot sing 
at all himself, jogs him and awakes him, and 
desires him to sing this or the other song, 
telling him two or three words of the begin-
ning of the song, [the Musician] presently 
. . . sings the whole song upon so slight and 
slender intimation: So the Mind of man be-
ing jogg’d and awakened by the impulses of 
outward objects is stirred up into a more full 
and cleare conception of what was but im-
perfectly hinted to her from externall occa-
sions; and this faculty I venture to call actuall 
Knowledge in such a sense as the sleeping 
Musicians skill might be called actuall Skill 
when he thought nothing of it. (20–21)
More plays on two meanings of actual: the 
first is roughly synonymous with “enacted” 
or “manifest” as opposed to “potential” or “la-
tent,” while the second is roughly synonymous 
with “active”—in the way that actual sin, as 
distinct from original sin, is the product of in-
dividual action. he sleeping musician’s skill is 
not actual in the irst sense; his mind is empty, 
and whatever skills he has are latent and im-
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perceptible. But his skill is actual in the sec-
ond sense, because it may come into being as 
a result of the activity that follows his arousal.
Likewise, innate knowledge is actual 
in that it arises through the activity of the 
mind ater it has been “jogg’d and awakened” 
or “stirred up” by “outward objects.” These 
outward objects do not generate knowledge; 
they only activate it. To support this claim, 
More considers geometric figures such as 
circles and triangles, asking how we can have 
knowledge of these igures if they do not ex-
ist in their perfect form anywhere in nature. 
The only possible answer, he concludes, is 
that our knowledge of these forms precedes 
any experience of nature (22). his argument, 
his description of outward objects as the “re-
minders” of preexisting knowledge, and his 
metaphoric account of sleeping knowledge 
“jogg’d and awakened” all vividly recall ar-
guments and metaphors found in Plato’s writ-
ings—most notably in the Meno, in which 
Socrates attempts to demonstrate that “all 
learning is but recollection” by walking an 
untutored boy through a geometric proof. 
By the end of Socrates’s demonstration, the 
youth understands the proof and agrees that 
it is valid, though Socrates has done nothing 
but ask him questions. herefore, Socrates in-
sists, the boy “has had true opinions in him 
which have only to be awakened by question-
ing to become knowledge” (86).
The metaphor of sleeping knowledge 
suggests that both More and Plato offered 
what historians of philosophy such as John 
Yolton have called a dispositional account of 
innateness, in which innate ideas are not im-
mediately present to the mind but are rather 
part of the mind’s implicit structure, ready 
to be called forth by a particular set of cir-
cumstances or through some active intellec-
tual process.4 More writes, “I doe not mean 
that there is a certain number of Ideas lar-
ing and shining to the Animadversive faculty 
like so many Torches or Starres in the Firma-
ment to our outward sight, or that there are 
any igures that take their distinct places, & 
are legibly writ there like the Red letters or 
Astronomical Characters in an Almanack”; 
rather, there is “an active sagacity in the Soul, 
or quick recollection as it were, whereby 
some small business being hinted unto her, 
she runs out presently into a more clear and 
larger conception” (20). Dispensing with the 
naive literalist conception of innatism epito-
mized by Culverwel’s “sacred Manuscript,” 
More turns to the language of hints and rec-
ollections, showing that partial, incomplete, 
or latent ideas may still be considered innate.5
More’s innatism pref igured a more 
sophisticated version defended by Ralph 
Cudworth, whose works, especially the post-
humous Treatise concerning Eternal and Im-
mutable Morality (1731), inf luenced many 
eighteenth- century thinkers. he editor of the 
treatise, Edward Chandler, wrote a preface 
positioning it as an important contribution to 
contemporary debates about ethical reason-
ing and moral certainty (Hutton, Introd. xiv–
xv), and like the work of other Cambridge 
Platonists the treatise supported its claims 
with an innatist epistemological framework. 
However, Cudworth largely discards the met-
aphoric language of Culverwel, Smith, and 
More, opting instead for a somewhat techni-
cal vocabulary: the soul possesses, Cudworth 
repeats insistently, “an innate cognoscitive 
[cognitive] power . . . of raising intelligible 
ideas and conceptions of things from within 
itself” (75). Cudworth is careful not to use in-
nate to refer to ideas themselves; rather, the 
mind actively generates ideas through an 
innate power, which it can exercise without 
the aid of external stimuli. Cudworth’s for-
mulation thus avoids certain ambiguities that 
attend More’s metaphor of the sleeping musi-
cian, in which innate ideas must be “jogg’d 
and awakened by the impulses of outward 
objects” and in which, though they must be 
awakened, innate ideas are nonetheless all 
but fully formed beforehand, having been 
learned at some point in the past. Cudworth’s 
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account is therefore both more innatist, in 
that external stimuli are not a prerequisite for 
the formation of innate ideas, and more dis-
positional, in that innate ideas do not exist at 
all in the mind before it exercises the innate 
power that enables their formation.
The works of the Cambridge Platonists 
provided crucial fuel for Locke’s epistemo-
logical intervention.6 A full quarter of his Es-
say concerning Human Understanding (1689) 
was devoted to a closely argued refutation of 
the doctrine of innate ideas, which he sum-
marizes as the “Opinion amongst some Men, 
hat there are in the Understanding certain 
innate Principles; some primary Notions, 
κοιναι εννοιαι [common notions], Characters, 
as it were stamped upon the Mind of Man, 
which the Soul receives in its very first Be-
ing” (48). Locke’s language calls to mind both 
Nathanael Culverwel’s “sacred Manuscript” 
and the “legibly writ” characters that More 
disavows. In other words, Locke is describ-
ing a nondispositional version of innatism, 
against which he launches a threefold attack. 
First, he challenges the “Universal Consent” 
argument—that because “certain Principles 
[are] universally agreed upon by all Man-
kind” these principles must be innate (49)—
by pointing out that this argument could only 
support innatism if innatists could show that 
no other explanation of universal consent is 
possible. Second, he insists that this argument 
actually defeats innatism, because no example 
of universal consent exists; even statements 
that we might expect to produce universal 
agreement in fact produce disagreement or 
confusion in some cases. And third, he draws 
a sharp contrast between ideas acquired 
by individual pains and labor and ideas ac-
quired through the bounty of nature—a kind 
of cognitive commons. In an argument that 
recalls his discussion of private property in 
the Second Treatise of Government (1689), he 
criticizes innatists for claiming that ideas de-
veloped through reason are merely part of a 
natural bounty. hat claim, he argues, ignores 
the essential contribution of individual labor 
to the development of those ideas.
With his inal argument, Locke attempted 
to associate innatism with intellectual lazi-
ness, but his arguments inadvertently over-
lapped with those of the Cambridge Platonists 
when it came to the notion of dispositions. 
Locke’s arguments against nondispositional 
innatism were less efective against disposi-
tional innatists like More and Cudworth, who 
agreed with Locke that the development of in-
nate knowledge required mental activity—as 
More’s “actuall Knowledge” attests. To More 
and Cudworth, we are innately disposed to 
act in ways that produce particular ideas, but 
we may be prevented from doing so. Seeming 
to recognize the challenge of dispositional 
innatism, Locke claimed that their position 
leads to a conceptual collapse: if the ideas that 
result from mental labor are innate, then all 
possible ideas must be innate. In that case, “all 
Propositions that are true, and the Mind is ca-
pable ever of assenting to, may be said to be in 
the Mind,” writes Locke, and “[s] o the Mind is 
[made] of all Truths it ever shall know.” Locke 
seems to hope that his readers will ind such 
a position counterintuitive, but the strongest 
argument Locke can ofer against it is that it 
is “a very improper way of speaking; which, 
whilst it pretends to assert the contrary, says 
nothing different from those, who deny in-
nate Principles” (49–50). Locke ignores the 
fact that a dispositional innatist could use the 
same line of reasoning against him; Locke’s 
own argument also leads, albeit in a differ-
ent direction, to a conceptual collapse. At this 
moment in the Essay, the dispute between in-
natism and empiricism seems to descend into 
a semantic disagreement, and the two epis-
temological views appear to be substantively 
equivalent. heir equivalence would reemerge 
in later debates about copyright law.
The remainder of Locke’s essay offers 
a detailed account of how ideas arise in the 
minds of individuals. Simple ideas, which 
are the direct and indivisible products of 
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experience, combine to form complex ideas, 
which Locke further taxonomizes. Locke 
also subdivides experience into two “Foun-
tains of Knowledge, from whence all the 
Ideas we have . . . do spring” (104), which he 
names “Sensation” and “Reflection.” Sensa-
tion denotes experience of the physical world 
through the senses, while Relection describes 
what might be called inward experience—the 
perception of one’s own mental processes. 
he claim that all ideas arise from either sen-
sation or relection has an important ramii-
cation for any discussion of copyright: ideas 
are strictly private, because both our sensory 
experiences and our inward experiences are 
private. The concept that ideas are private 
leads Locke to some startling conclusions 
about language, which he hints at early in 
his discussion of ideas: “if it should happen 
that any two thinking men should really have 
diferent ideas, I do not see how they could 
discourse or argue one with another” (180). 
If language could communicate ideas, there 
would be no such bar to discourse, but for 
Locke language communicates no ideas at all.
Where does this leave the notion of com-
munication? he concept of innate ideas gave 
the Cambridge Platonists a ready- made the-
ory of communication, one that seemed so 
straightforward and obvious that they hardly 
needed to articulate it (Dawson 619). Innate 
ideas expedite the construction of linguistic 
infrastructures, giving speaker and writer, 
listener and reader access to the same cog-
nitive scafolding. To understand the mean-
ing of a text, readers need only seek within 
themselves the ideas under discussion; the 
ideas remain the same, no matter in whose 
mind they appear. But perhaps this theory of 
communication was too strong: if everyone 
already has access to exactly the same ideas, 
why is communication ever necessary? Keep-
ing in mind Locke’s emphasis on the labor 
required to produce ideas, one might argue 
that communication is necessary precisely 
because some ideas are not innate.
Conversely, Locke’s theory of commu-
nication may have been too weak. His re-
jection of the universality and innateness of 
ideas suggested that communication is not 
as straightforward a process as his precur-
sors had assumed, and at times in the Essay 
Locke seemed even to doubt the possibility 
of communication. He did eventually offer 
an account of communication based on uni-
versal ideas, but these ideas are universal not 
in a necessary but in a practical sense: their 
universality is predicated on the assumed 
uniformity of human experience and human 
physiology. Should parties to a conversation 
have diferent ideas, because either their ex-
periences or their physiologies radically dif-
fer, that universality fails, and with it any 
straightforward attempt to communicate.
hese were central issues for eighteenth- 
century copyright law because cases such as 
Tonson v. Collins (1762) and Millar v. Taylor 
(1769) turned on the question of what a book 
communicates from author to reader—and 
what a book does not communicate. he term 
communicate comes from the Latin commu-
nicare, to make common; and to prevail in 
court, copyright perpetualists had to argue 
for a failure of communication in this sense. 
They had to show how the publication of 
ideas might not make them common. Locke’s 
account of ideas thus appears more congenial 
to copyright perpetualism than the Cam-
bridge Platonists’ account does, insofar as it 
theorizes the possibility of communicative 
failure. By taking a Lockean view of ideas, 
copyright perpetualists were able to argue 
that the transmission of texts does not entail 
the transmission of ideas; far from being un-
protectable, as in modern copyright law, ideas 
were the inalienable property of their author. 
However, Locke’s epistemology was not the 
only option copyright perpetualists had. It 
was also possible to imagine a version of in-
natism that entailed a similar communica-
tive failure: the innatism espoused in Edward 
Young’s Conjectures on Original Composition.
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Edward Young’s Synthesis
Young’s Conjectures (1759) has oten been re-
garded as a seminal text in the history of au-
thorship. hrough his writing on originality 
and genius, Young influenced the course of 
romanticisms in Great Britain and Germany, 
and in doing so he strengthened the case for 
authorial copyright. As Martha Woodmansee 
has argued, ideas popularized by Young’s essay 
(which was translated into German the year of 
its publication) bolstered a growing demand 
for copyright legislation among German au-
thors of the Romantic era (430). Likewise, 
Mark Rose inds Young’s thoughts congenial 
to the ascent of proprietary authorship in 
Great Britain, insofar as they anticipate “the 
organic analogy of the romantics” (“Author” 
61). But both Rose and Woodmansee associate 
Young with copyright law by reading Conjec-
tures as a proto- Romantic text, and their argu-
ments must therefore recontextualize Young’s 
essay geographically or temporally. When one 
reads Conjectures in the immediate context of 
its publication, however, a diferent picture of 
Young’s relation to copyright emerges. Forty 
years before Wordsworth took up the “organic 
analogy” at the heart of Young’s essay, Conjec-
tures read not as a proto- Romantic text but as a 
post- Platonic text—a modulated continuation 
of ideas that Cudworth and other Cambridge 
Platonists had developed and defended a cen-
tury before. In short, Young was an innatist.
he linchpin of Young’s innatist argument 
in Conjectures is another analogy: between 
genius and conscience. Conscience denoted 
“inward knowledge,” and in the early to mid–
eighteenth century it was at the center of a dis-
pute over the innateness of the faculty of moral 
judgment.7 As late as 1744, Jonathan Swit had 
insisted that conscience “properly signiies the 
Knowledge which a Man hath within himself 
of his own Thoughts and Actions” and that 
such knowledge is useless for the purposes of 
moral judgment unless supplemented by the 
study of scripture (24). Swit’s quasi- empirical 
stance here allies him with Locke and puts 
him at odds with followers of the Cambridge 
Platonists such as Joseph Butler and Anthony 
Ashley- Cooper, third earl of Shatesbury, both 
of whom viewed conscience as an innate fac-
ulty of moral judgment.8 By the time Young 
wrote Conjectures, conscience had become 
irmly associated with Shatesbury’s and But-
ler’s antiempirical view, and Young uses the 
term accordingly: “With regard to the Moral 
world, Conscience, with regard to the Intellec-
tual, Genius, is that God within. Genius can 
set us right in Composition, without the Rules 
of the Learned; as Conscience sets us right in 
Life, without the Laws of the Land” (30–31). 
Conscience is “that God within,” fully present 
in individuals before they learn institutional 
rules and at times perhaps even opposed to 
those rules. By characterizing conscience as a 
faculty that guides us “without the Laws of the 
Land,” Young echoes Shatesbury’s critique of 
the claim, made famous by homas Hobbes, 
that the state is the only guarantor of individ-
uals’ moral behavior. Conscience, for Young 
and Shatesbury, precedes institutions of law; 
likewise, Young insists, genius precedes insti-
tutions of learning. 
In addition to being innatist, Young’s 
conception of genius is dispositional. A writer 
“may possess dormant, unsuspected abili-
ties,” a fact that “is evident from the sudden 
eruption of some men, out of perfect obscu-
rity, into public admiration, on the strong 
impulse of some animating occasion; not 
more to the world’s great surprize, than their 
own.” Genius hides its gits, like More’s sleep-
ing musician, “till awakened by loud calls, 
or stung up by striking emergencies.” Until 
then, a writer may remain “scarce less igno-
rant of his own powers, than an Oyster of its 
pearl, or a Rock of its diamond” (49–50). Like 
his philosophical precursors, Young preempts 
any argument that genius must not be innate 
because it is not apparent from birth. Genius 
need not be visible to be present.
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Elsewhere, though, the difference be-
tween Young’s innatism and the innatism of 
Shaftesbury and the Cambridge Platonists 
becomes more apparent. he Cambridge Pla-
tonists had held that innate ideas were also 
universal; similarly, Shatesbury insisted that 
our “Sense of Right and Wrong” is a “first 
Principle in our Constitution & Make” (44), 
and he argued that the universality of con-
science facilitates a natural process of com-
munity formation. But for Young genius is 
not universal and does not unite individuals 
into a community; genius creates distinc-
tions between them. “Let thy Genius rise,” he 
commands, “(if a Genius thou hast)” (53)—
and much of Young’s essay is dedicated to 
the problem of discovering whether one has 
genius or not. Combined with Young’s dis-
positionalism, the belief that not all writers 
have genius produces a belletristic Calvin-
ism; genius may emerge without prior indi-
cation, leaving would- be writers of genius to 
constantly seek signs of their place among the 
literary elect. “Know Thyself. . . . Dive deep 
into thy bosom,” exhorts Young, and “learn 
the depth, extent, bias, and full fort of thy 
Mind” (53), and if genius is to be found there, 
“hyself so reverence as to prefer the native 
growth of thy own mind to the richest import 
from abroad” (54). But this holds only if one 
does indeed have genius: “as nothing is more 
easy than to write originally wrong; Originals 
are not here recommended, but under the 
strong guard of my irst rule—Know thyself ” 
(61). Without the support of genius, original-
ity is a handicap, a literary vice.
It is in the context of this stark divide 
between literary haves and have- nots that 
Young links genius most visibly to property. 
he writer of genius who reverences himself, 
Young asserts,
will soon ind the world’s reverence to follow 
his own. His works will stand distinguished; 
his the sole Property of them; which Prop-
erty alone can confer the noble title of an Au-
thor; that is, of one who (to speak accurately) 
thinks, and composes; while other invaders 
of the Press, how voluminous, and learned 
soever, (with due respect be it spoken) only 
read, and write. (54)
his passage marks a critical shit from the 
universalist innatism of the Cambridge Pla-
tonists to an exclusionary innatism—a novel 
version of innatism that is uniquely suited to 
form the basis of a property claim. One of the 
hallmarks of property, as Joseph Yates would 
insist a decade later in the milestone copy-
right case Millar v. Taylor, is that it grants 
“sole and exclusive Enjoyment” of an object 
(Question 73). But if ideas are both innate and 
universally held—even if only potentially—
then such exclusive enjoyment is contrary 
to their nature. Young’s theory of genius by-
passes this problem, articulating a propri-
etary Platonism in which some ideas are 
indeed exclusively possessed. Anyone can im-
itate a work of genius, but imitation amounts 
to nothing more than a loan: “Learning is 
borrowed knowledge,” while, by contrast, 
“Genius is knowledge innate, and quite our 
own” (36). This incommensurable gap be-
tween imitation and creation means that the 
“noble title of an Author” is nontransferable, 
a fact that Young reiterates through another 
organic metaphor: “An Original author is 
born of himself, is his own progenitor, and 
will probably propagate a numerous ofspring 
of Imitators, to eternize his glory; while mule- 
like Imitators, die without Issue” (68).
Young’s proprietary Platonism stands 
in stark opposition to many of Locke’s ideas. 
For example, Locke’s critique of innatism as 
a product and propagator of intellectual la-
ziness applies to Young’s arguments about 
genius just as well as it does to any of the 
Cambridge Platonists’ arguments about “ac-
tuall Knowledge” or “innate cognoscitive 
power.” But despite their diferences, Young 
and Locke agree that at least some kinds of 
ideas are exclusively held by the mind that 
1 3 1 . 2  ] Jonathan Scott Enderle 297
 
creates them and are strictly nontransfer-
able—or, one might say, incommunicable. To 
be sure, ideas are incommunicable in Young’s 
and Locke’s accounts for different reasons; 
but both accounts hold out the possibility that 
authors retain something when they commu-
nicate through a work. hat possibility of re-
tention formed the basis of the property claim 
that William Blackstone and his allies made 
in the mid- century copyright cases.
Copyright and Communication
In April and May of 1759, the banker and 
bookseller Benjamin Collins printed, pub-
lished, and sold copies of Joseph Addison 
and Richard Steele’s Spectator. Collins was 
not the copyright holder; Jacob Tonson had 
purchased copyright in the work forty- seven 
years before. But since the only applicable 
copyright law, the Statute of Anne (1710), 
protected works for twenty- eight years, Col-
lins could not be prosecuted under it; as far 
as the statute was concerned, the work had 
entered the public domain. Nonetheless, 
Tonson’s heirs, his sons Jacob and Richard, 
brought a suit against Collins, claiming that 
he had invaded their literary property. The 
Tonsons argued that they retained copyright 
in the Spectator despite the limited term of 
the Statute of Anne: copyright, far from be-
ing the temporary consequence of a statutory 
monopoly, was literary property in the fullest 
sense. Like any other property, they main-
tained, it was protected in perpetuity by the 
common law, independent of any statute, and 
was recognized not only by ancient usage but 
also by reason and natural right.9
The plaintiffs in Tonson v. Collins were 
not the irst to make such an argument, and 
the case did not set a lasting precedent; the 
Court of King’s Bench refused to consider 
it further after finding that the plaintiffs 
and defendant were colluding in an effort 
to produce a ruling favorable to themselves 
and their fellow booksellers in the London 
trade. Nonetheless, the case was historically 
significant because it featured two figures 
who would later participate in the precedent- 
setting cases Millar v. Taylor and Donaldson 
v. Beckett (1774). William Blackstone, the au-
thor of the inluential Commentaries on the 
Laws of En gland (1765), was a counsel for the 
plaintifs in Tonson v. Collins and went on to 
represent another London bookseller in Mil-
lar v. Taylor and to defend literary property 
before the House of Lords as one of twelve 
advisory judges in Donaldson v. Beckett 
(1774). Joseph Yates, the defendant’s counsel 
in Tonson v. Collins, would take a place on the 
Court of King’s Bench and write the dissent-
ing opinion in Millar v. Taylor, setting forth a 
critique of literary property that remains sa-
lient ater more than two hundred years.
The case was heard twice, in 1761 and 
1762, before the Court of King’s Bench, Lord 
Mansfield presiding as chief justice. Alex-
ander Wedderburn argued for the plaintifs 
at the irst hearing and attempted to restrict 
the property claim of authors to the proits of 
publication. his was, he claimed, an incor-
poreal property right, but only in the sense 
that, for example, the right of way across a 
tract of land is incorporeal; such incorpo-
real rights in corporeal entities were by this 
time fairly well established in the common 
law. “When I speak of the Right of Property,” 
declared Wedderburn, “I mean in the Proits 
of his Book; not in the Sentiments, Stile, &c” 
(Tonson v. Collins [1761] 302). Wedderburn 
was hoping to sidestep the argument that sen-
timent and style are incorporeal, impossible 
to possess exclusively, and therefore incapable 
of supporting any property right whatsoever. 
However, when the case was heard a second 
time, in 1762, William Blackstone took Wed-
derburn’s place and made a much bolder 
claim. Not content to sidestep the argument 
that sentiment and style are incorporeal and 
impossible to possess, Blackstone attacked it 
head- on. Quoting Edward hurlow, the bar-
rister who had argued for the defendants 
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in 1761, Blackstone insisted that a “‘literary 
Composition, as it lies in the Author’s Mind, 
before it is substantiated by reducing it into 
Writing,’ has the essential Requisites to make 
it the Subject of Property” (Tonson v. Collins 
[1762] 322).10 Although Blackstone then refers 
to Locke’s labor theory of property, the essen-
tial foundation of his argument is a Lockean 
view of ideas. While a literary composition
lies dormant in the Mind, it is absolutely in the 
Power of the Proprietor. He alone is intitled to 
the Profits of communicating, or making it 
public. he irst Step to which, is cloathing our 
conceptions in Words, the only Means to com-
municate abstracted Ideas. Ideas drawn from 
external Objects, may be communicated by 
external signs; but Words only, demonstrate 
the genuine Operations of the Intellect. (323)
In this passage, the philosophical assump-
tions that underlie Blackstone’s argument 
immediately become clear. His distinction 
between “Ideas drawn from external Objects” 
and “abstracted Ideas” parallels the dichot-
omy developed by Locke and widely deployed 
in his Essay concerning Human Understand-
ing (1689) to explain how abstractions such as 
numbers or geometric forms can arise from 
sense impressions. hat parallel alone indi-
cates that Blackstone was drawing not only 
from Locke’s political theory but also from 
his epistemological theory. More broadly, 
this passage shows that Blackstone cannot 
be thinking of ideas in an innatist way. he 
very notion that ideas in the mind are “abso-
lutely in the Power of the Proprietor” directly 
contradicts any theory holding ideas to be 
universal and innate. Even if an idea is imme-
diately present in just one mind, the mind of 
the so- called proprietor, a dispositional form 
of innatism would hold that it is potentially 
present in the minds of all others; the “pro-
prietor” could do nothing to prevent any of 
them from acquiring it on their own.
For Blackstone, then, ideas are the prod-
uct of individual experience and mental la-
bor—that is, sensation and relection in the 
Lockean sense—and the right of property in 
ideas arises naturally from that fact.11 Black-
stone reinforces this line of reasoning with a 
subtle shit in diction over the course of his 
first argument. Initially, the word he uses 
most often to refer to mental equipment is 
idea, but as he continues he begins to favor 
another term: sentiment. Two paragraphs af-
ter asserting that we communicate by “cloath-
ing our conceptions in Words, the only Means 
to communicate abstracted Ideas,” he per-
forms a nearly parallel substitution: “Words 
are the Vehicle of Sentiments” (323; italics 
mine). He then insists that sentiment is the 
essence of literary property, stating that “[t] he 
Sentiment therefore is the Thing of Value, 
from which the Proit must arise” (323–24), 
though just a few paragraphs earlier he had 
argued that literary property is founded on 
“Occupancy in Ideas” (321). Blackstone ap-
pears to be using the words idea and senti-
ment interchangeably, but to treat the two 
terms as mere synonyms misses a range of 
important distinctions. When one examines 
the etymology of the two words, Blackstone’s 
shit appears strategic: sentiment is based on 
the same Latin root as sense, and in the eigh-
teenth century it was still occasionally used 
to refer to sense impressions. In his Enquiry 
concerning Human Understanding (1748) 
David Hume used inward sentiment and out-
ward sentiment to refer to roughly the same 
concepts that Locke had called relection and 
sensation, thus associating the term sentiment 
with private experience. By contrast, the ety-
mological root of idea is the Ancient Greek 
ίδέα, a term Plato had used to denote eternal 
forms. Insofar as it was linked to a philosoph-
ical tradition claiming that all mental objects 
are held in common, idea was a troublesome 
word for Blackstone, and he learned quickly 
to eschew it. Blackstone’s use of sentiment also 
placed him in a complex tradition of thought 
that attempted to reconcile theories of uni-
versal moral knowledge and judgment with 
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Lockean empiricism. It is beyond the scope of 
this essay to describe the full semantic range 
of the term, but just two years before Black-
stone made his argument, Adam Smith had 
used sentiment to describe a model of emo-
tional contagion and communicability in his 
heory of Moral Sentiments (1759). hat model 
depended on the Lockean assumption that 
all human beings share certain physical and 
mental structures; for Smith, as for Locke, 
if that assumption fails, so does communi-
cation. Smith’s arguments were inf luenced 
by similar claims made by Hume and Fran-
ces Hutcheson, both of whom had reframed 
moral judgments as direct experiences by 
positing the existence of a “moral sense” sub-
ject to the same Lockean assumption (Carey 
103). In each of these cases, sentiment signi-
ies a break with innatism by acknowledging 
the possibility, however remote, that our ideas 
may be radically irreconcilable.
As these complexities illustrate, Black-
stone’s account of ideas corresponds closely to 
Locke’s, but not perfectly. Blackstone speaks 
of ideas being communicated, whereas for 
Locke communication may occur, but ideas 
are never themselves communicated. We 
might assume that when he speaks about 
communication Blackstone means just what 
Locke does—that is, communication not of 
but about ideas—yet this interpretation poses 
certain problems for Blackstone’s argument. 
Ater all, if communication does occur in the 
Lockean sense, then by Locke’s explicit asser-
tion both parties must already have the same 
ideas. Even more troublesome for Blackstone’s 
argument is the fact that for Lockean com-
munication to occur between readers and an 
author, the readers must have come by their 
ideas the same way the author did—through 
their own mental labor. Why, then, should 
the author have any more right to those ideas 
than the reader? On the other hand, if no 
communication between readers and author 
occurs, it is diicult to surmise how a literary 
work could have value at all. Clearly Black-
stone requires a model of communication, or 
at least of reading, diferent from anything we 
have encountered so far. In fact, Blackstone 
hints at such a model in his rebuttal of Yates, 
whose counterargument exposes some of the 
potential diiculties of Blackstone’s position.
In Tonson v. Collins (1762), Yates founds 
his argument against literary property on an 
innatist understanding of communication. 
He begins by conceding that mental labor 
does grant a property right. However, “this, 
and every other Kind of Property may be ren-
dered common, by the act of the Proprietor,” 
and publication is the act of rendering com-
mon one’s mental property: “the Author has 
a Property in his Sentiments, till he publishes 
them. . . . But from the Moment of Publica-
tion, they are thrown into a State of universal 
Communion.” Two En glish cognates of the 
Latin communis, common and communion, 
foreshadow the direction of Yates’s argument. 
He then considers the prerequisites for a 
property claim, insisting that an item of prop-
erty must be capable of “separate and exclu-
sive Enjoyment” and that “actual Possession is 
not always necessary, yet potential Possession 
is” (333). hough he does not say so explicitly, 
Yates implies that incorporeal rights such as 
the right of way across land arise from the 
possibility of exclusion. Right of way exists, in 
short, because it may be enforced or denied by 
corporeal means. But this is not so of ideas:
he original MS. is not, nor ever was, in the 
Hands of the Defendants. he Books sold are 
not, nor ever were, the Property of the Plain-
tifs. he Paper and Ink belonged to the Defen-
dants. All the Plaintifs can claim is, the Ideas 
which the Books communicate. hese, when 
published, the World is as fully in Possession 
of, as the Author was before. From the mo-
ment of Publication, the Author could never 
conine them to his own Enjoyment. (334)
Ater the physical book is sold, nothing cor-
poreal remains for the author or publisher to 
lay claim to; and because Yates takes an inna-
300 Common Knowledge: Epistemology and the Beginnings of Copyright Law  [ P M L A
 
tist view of communication, he insists that the 
act of communicating an idea destroys any 
possibility of exclusively possessing it. Filling 
out Yates’s argument from the perspective of 
a dispositional innatist and universalist, we 
might say that the author’s ideas were already 
potentially in the possession of all readers and 
that by publishing them the author actual-
izes that possession, so that no further legal 
distinction can be made between the author’s 
possession of the ideas and readers’ possession 
of them. Since the author can no longer exer-
cise any form of exclusive possession over the 
ideas, they can no longer be subject to prop-
erty law, which, Yates reiterates, “acts only 
upon Subjects, where there is a Possibility of 
separate and exclusive Enjoyment” (334).
Yates’s repeated emphasis on “separate 
and exclusive Enjoyment” indicates that his 
concern with corporeality and incorporeal-
ity has more to do with the speciic problem 
of exclusion than with a vague metaphysical 
qualm about incorporeal property. However, 
Blackstone’s rebuttal attacks a straw man, 
focusing only on Yates’s discussion of corpo-
reality and entirely neglecting his argument 
about exclusion. Indeed, neither Blackstone 
nor Yates seemed to fully realize that their 
disagreement arose from two dramatically 
diferent deinitions of the word idea. How-
ever, Blackstone does ofer one analogy that 
strikes near the heart of their disagreement. 
Disputing Yates’s claim that a published work 
is, “like Land thrown into the Highway . . . a 
Git to the Public,” Blackstone counters that 
publishing a book “is more like making a Way 
through a Man’s own private Grounds, which 
he may stop at Pleasure; He may give out a 
Number of Keys, by publishing a Number of 
Copies; but no Man, who receives a Key, has 
thereby a Right to forge others, and sell them 
to other people” (341). In this analogy, the re-
lations among author, idea, work, and reader 
in Blackstone’s view become momentarily 
crystallized. According to Locke, ideas are 
not held in common but are the inalienable 
property of their creators, having been gen-
erated by individual experience and mental 
labor. A work is not a collection of its author’s 
ideas but rather a key that opens a passage 
through its author’s mind, giving readers a 
particular kind of access to those ideas. No 
ideas ever change hands, but, just as one 
might stroll along a fenced path to view the 
terrain beyond, readers are able to experience 
the author’s ideas and to develop ideas of their 
own from that experience. A key is alienable, 
but the lands to which it grants access remain 
the property of their owner, and it is a breach 
of that property to copy the key without per-
mission. Likewise, a work is alienable, but the 
ideas it grants access to remain the property 
of their creator; therefore one may possess a 
work without possessing the right to copy it.
Not only does Blackstone’s analogy clar-
ify these relations, it also hints at a model of 
reading that might help Blackstone defend 
literary property from a Lockean standpoint; 
but this is a model of reading as noncommu-
nication. In this model the value of the work 
comes not from the ideas that it communi-
cates but from the experience that it enables 
readers to have. Young, too, takes such a view 
of literary value: “he mind of a man of Ge-
nius is a fertile and pleasant field,” and the 
work of genius “opens a back- door . . . into 
a delicious Garden of Moral and Intellectual 
fruits and lowers; the Key of which is denied 
to the rest of mankind” (9, 5). These fruits 
and f lowers never change hands; the plea-
sure of observing them is enough. he work 
is an “Amusement” and a “Refuge”; through 
it the reader is “quieted” and “refreshed” and 
takes a “pleasing Pause” (5–6); but does the 
work communicate anything? Perhaps so, but 
whatever is communicated cannot be passed 
on; it is not valuable to anyone but the recipi-
ent, who cannot transmit the same experience 
on to another. he pleasures of reading a work 
of genius simultaneously prove the richness 
of genius and the impoverishment of passive 
reception, and they leave little possibility for 
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intellectual reciprocity. For Young anything 
communicable is, at best, mere learning—
“borrowed knowledge” available for loan by 
anyone and therefore worth little (36).
If Blackstone’s argument is to be sound, 
he must agree with Young on this: for com-
munication to occur, whatever is commu-
nicated cannot be literary property—even 
from a Lockean perspective on ideas. For if 
readers’ ideas are indeed the same as the au-
thor’s ideas, as Locke insists is necessary for 
communication, and if readers produce them 
by their own labor, as the author did before 
them, then there remains nothing to be held 
as property. At this point, the Lockean model 
of communication begins to look similar to 
the model of communication implicitly pro-
posed by the Cambridge Platonists. Ideas may 
come from experience rather than from an 
“innate cognoscitive power,” but they are ef-
fectively common property either way, at least 
potentially, because otherwise no communi-
cation could occur. he equivalence between 
innatism and empiricism hinted at in Locke’s 
Essay begins to reassert itself here. As long as 
Blackstone holds on to the notion of commu-
nication, he is caught in a double bind—an 
inescapable consequence of the paradox of 
communicable property. 
Almost eight years after Tonson v. Col-
lins, Yates and Blackstone again defended 
opposing positions in the literary- property 
debate. This time Yates stood on the other 
side of the bar, as one of the four justices in 
Millar v. Taylor. However, as the sole dissenter 
in the case, he stood alone, having failed to 
sway the court against the idea of literary 
property. he center of the literary- property 
debates shited from the En glish to the Scot-
tish courts, where an innatist view of ideas 
continued to play a role. Hinton v. Donaldson 
(1773), the case in Scotland that contradicted 
Millar v. Taylor, set the stage for the estab-
lishment of the public domain in Donaldson 
v. Beckett (1774). In Hinton, Alexander Don-
aldson’s counsel made a familiar argument:
Suppose two diferent men compose tables of 
interest; if both their calculations are exact, 
they must, according to the rules of arithme-
tic, turn out to be the same. his observation 
will apply to most kinds of tables or calcula-
tions, as on life- annuities, logarithms, alma-
nacks, &c. If the irst publishers of any such 
works were to have a perpetual monopoly, how 
absurd would such a position be, and how un-
just to the rest of mankind! (Information 19)
In a line of reasoning reminiscent of the argu-
ments that Smith, Culverwel, and Cudworth 
had made a century before, Donaldson’s 
counsel argued that the universal nature of 
mathematical truths—whether our knowl-
edge of them is founded on empirical obser-
vations or on innate dispositions—directly 
contradicts the logic of literary property. he 
possibility of communication is founded on 
these truths, and thus if communication is 
possible, literary property cannot exist ex-
cept as a statutory monopoly. There is only 
one situation, Donaldson’s counsel argued, 
“in which it can be igured that an author re-
tains the exclusive enjoyment of his ideas, af-
ter having published them, viz. if he writes in 
an unknown language, or character invented 
by himself, and which he alone can decypher” 
(Information 11). he regime of literary prop-
erty is a regime of encryption, in which the 
reader’s understanding of the text is endlessly 
deferred but the possibility of understanding 
remains, and in which the proprietary work is 
held forever just out of its reader’s grasp.
Incommunicable Things
At the beginning of his argument, Donald-
son’s counsel in Hinton v. Donaldson turned 
to a question that seemed to involve corpo-
reality. “Property,” he argued, “is deined to 
be, jus in re; and there can be no property 
without a subject or corpus, to which it re-
fers” (Information 5–6). Like Yates, he pro-
ceeded to argue that this is not an arbitrary 
restriction; rather, it arises because incorpo-
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real entities cannot be exclusively possessed. 
For that reason, the role of corporeality in his 
argument is secondary. If we could create an 
incorporeal thing that could be possessed by 
one person, to the absolute exclusion of all 
others, then there could be no objection to 
incorporeal property along these lines. But 
Donaldson’s counsel dismisses that possibil-
ity in his progression from res to corpus. He 
began with a deinition of property as jus in 
re, right in a thing—a more vaguely deined 
entity than the corpus, the body. By slipping 
from thing to body, Donaldson’s counsel as-
sociated thingness with the possibility of 
exclusive possession, while simultaneously 
discounting the existence of bodiless things.
However, as I have argued, Locke’s epis-
temology had introduced the possibility that 
ideas might indeed be bodiless things—in-
corporeal entities that could be possessed ex-
clusively. In this account, ideas are, at their 
foundation, mute; they cannot be transferred 
or exchanged, and there is no marketplace of 
ideas. Locke backs away from this point of 
view by arguing that because we have similar 
bodies and minds, and because we live in the 
same physical world, we must all have similar 
ideas; and so even if our ideas themselves re-
fuse to speak, we can talk about them and tell 
one another how to re-create them through 
sensation and ref lection—through experi-
ence.12 But copyright perpetualists welcomed 
this refusal to speak, making it the basis of 
a property claim with respect to texts that, 
paradoxically, express ideas without commu-
nicating them.
In a diferent kind of essay, I might have 
traced through these latter two perspectives a 
genealogy of speech and experience—of voice 
and phenomenon—to the twentieth century 
and into the present day. Both perspectives 
are opposed to an innatist point of view that 
tries to convince us of the transparency of all 
communication—as if by talking to one an-
other we are only talking to ourselves. But to-
gether they introduce a new opposition that 
bears some relation to a set of phenomeno-
logical concepts articulated by Edmund Hus-
serl in his Logical Investigations (1900). In an 
argument crucial to his own project and to 
its inluence over later continental philoso-
phy, Husserl distinguishes between two par-
tially overlapping kinds of signs—those that 
indicate and those that express. Some signs 
merely indicate by associating one thing with 
another in a way that is not only noncausal 
but also not yet linguistic; others communi-
cate meaning in its fullest sense by both ex-
pressing and indicating; and still others only 
express, without indicating or communicat-
ing anything. As an example of the last kind 
of sign, Husserl ofers the soliloquy: “here is 
no speech in such cases,” he writes, “nor does 
one tell oneself anything” (280). Communi-
cation demands telling, and how could we 
possibly tell our self- present selves something 
we do not already know? Viewed from some 
angles, Blackstone’s noncommunicative ex-
pression looks much like a Husserlian solilo-
quy. he copyrighted work takes the guise of 
an author’s self- directed speech; an audience 
may listen in this case, but the author’s words 
have no clear indicative force.
From there, this hypothetical genealogy 
might follow Jacques Derrida from his rejec-
tion of Husserlian self- presence, in Voice and 
Phenomenon (1967), to his later discussion 
of “the truth of the copyright and the copy-
right of the truth” in “Limited Inc a b c . . .” 
(1977 [30])—thus returning to the point from 
which my discussion began. Derrida might 
emerge as a rescuer, who by rejecting Husser-
lian soliloquy also rejects the dangerous legal 
arguments that created, for a brief period, 
a legal regime of perpetual copyright.13 But 
these subsequent moves risk diverting our 
attention from current discussions of phe-
nomenological diversity that give new force 
to Blackstone’s reasoning. Recent years have 
seen several waves of criticism and theory at-
tentive to communicative disavowal. Specu-
lative realists have reimagined scientific 
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enterprise as a struggle to force recalcitrant 
things to indicate what they have so far only 
expressed in secret; scholars in animal stud-
ies have explored the possibility that other 
species may inhabit a world of meaning in-
accessible to us; and afect theorists have de-
fended the rights of human beings to linger 
on the aspects of personal experience that 
resist communication and absorption into a 
shared horizon of the given. Blackstone’s ar-
guments show us that these ways of thinking 
could have proprietary ramiications and that 
we must pursue them in a way that balances 
our desire for an open society with our de-
fense of a right not to speak.
In yet another kind of essay, I might 
have traced a different genealogy, linking 
these early ways of thinking about idea and 
expression to modern copyright law. In the 
twentieth century, it has become an estab-
lished doctrine in the Anglo- American con-
text that copyright protects not the ideas 
but the expression of the ideas in a text. his 
doctrine attempts to distinguish imitations 
that directly copy specific portions of text, 
characters, or plotlines from those that bor-
row only broad outlines, general archetypes, 
or global plot structures. On a cursory view, 
the diferent ways of thinking about commu-
nication that I’ve discussed might look like 
ancestors of this idea- expression dichotomy. 
But although there were glimmerings of that 
distinction in eighteenth- century court cases, 
modern commentators have been too quick 
to read those glimmerings as evidence of a 
stable and well- theorized dichotomy. When 
William Blackstone asserted in Tonson v. Col-
lins that “style and sentiment are the essen-
tials of a literary composition,” his use of style 
hints at a modern understanding of copyright 
as protected expression. But there are reasons 
to doubt that Blackstone is using style in this 
modern sense. By describing the process of 
composition as “cloathing our conceptions in 
Words,” Blackstone echoes lines from Pope’s 
“Essay on Criticism” (1711) that emphasized 
not the separability of style and sentiment but 
their necessary unity in well- crated writing:
Expression is the Dress of hought, and still 
Appears more decent as more suitable 
A vile Conceit in pompous Words exprest, 
Is like a Clown in regal Purple drest; 
For dif’rent Styles with dif’rent Subjects sort, 
As several Garbs with Country, Town, and  
  Court. (lines 318–23)
For Pope, and perhaps still for Blackstone, 
style and sentiment were distinct but closely 
linked—not dichotomous. By reading these 
moments in Blackstone’s argument as an-
ticipations of modern legal doctrine, we 
gloss over much of the texture of eighteenth- 
century thought about copyright.
Instead of projecting the present back 
onto the past, we might study the beginnings 
of copyright to think about ways of relaxing 
the rigid legal distinction between idea and 
expression—to reconceive that distinction in 
terms not only of writing but also of reading, 
imagining reading as a mode of expression as 
well as a mode of reception—and to see in the 
course of development of these ideas alterna-
tives to both the modern copyright regime 
and the critical commonplaces that we have 
inherited. My approach to the early years of 
copyright focuses on the broad range of an-
swers that eighteenth- century thinkers ofered 
to the question What do texts do? In natists 
emphasized the universality of ideas and con-
ceived of texts as tools of communication that 
functioned smoothly and transparently to 
link authors to readers; empiricists drew at-
tention to ways those tools broke down, with 
the hope of repairing them; and copyright 
perpetualists embraced the tools’ breakdown 
as a way of turning ideas and the texts that 
expressed them into things. For expediency 
I have presented these as three competing 
points of view, but my intention has not been 
to embrace one of them while discarding 
the others. Instead, I propose that all three 
articulate useful ways of thinking about the 
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encounters between author, text, and reader. 
For copyright perpetualists, an uncommuni-
cative text speaks to us of foreign experiences 
in an alien language; for empiricists, a text 
speaks in a half- learned tongue, tantalizing 
in its partial coherence; and for innatists, the 
text whispers familiarly in our ear, transpar-
ent in its meaning and obvious in its intent. 
Our paths through these modes of encounter 
need not be unidirectional, nor should they 
be, since each is latent in the other two. Only 
by a long series of turns and returns through 
these modes do we learn what texts do.
NOTES
1. E.g., Woodmansee 426, 448 and Rose, Authors 142. 
More recently, Greene and Temple have produced work 
in this vein. Reform- minded legal historians (e.g., Deaz-
ley) have also been inluenced by more- materialist points 
of view.
2. Stern outlines the history of the labor theory of 
property in Anglo- American copyright law.
3. For examples of such religious thinkers, see Yolton 
102.
4. here is some debate about whether the innatism of 
Plato’s Meno was indeed dispositional (Rawson).
5. Related views have experienced a resurgence in re-
cent thought about language and cognition (Rogers 203; 
Samet and Zaitchik).
6. Among Locke’s other interlocutors were René 
Descartes and Edward Stillingleet, bishop of Worcester 
(Rickless). Stoicism is sometimes seen as another impor-
tant strain of innatism to which Locke was responding—
“common notions” was a Stoic concept—but Stoicism 
may be interpreted as broadly compatible with Lockean 
empiricism (Sellars 74–78).
7. Odell provides a full analysis of Young’s analogy 
between genius and conscience.
8. Gill describes Shaftesbury’s indebtedness to the 
Cambridge Platonists in detail (71–77).
9. For excellent accounts of Tonson v. Collins see 
Deaz ley 142–47 and Rose, Authors 78–86.
10. his argument contradicts a number of modern 
copyright doctrines, including the strict distinction be-
tween idea and expression.
11. Locke himself did not support this line of reason-
ing (Deazley 3–4).
12. Dawson gives a lucid account of Locke’s views on 
communication (esp. 627–32).
13. he precedent set by Millar v. Taylor stood from 
1769 to 1774.
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